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Abstract 
Network steganography has been a well-known covert data channeling method for over three decades. The 
basic set of techniques and implementation tools have not changed significantly since their introduction in 
the early 1980’s. In this paper, we review the predominant methods of classical network steganography, 
describing the detailed operations and resultant challenges involved in embedding data in the network 
transport domain.  We also consider the various cyber threat vectors of network steganography and point 
out the major differences between classical network steganography and the widely known end-point 
multimedia embedding techniques, which focus exclusively on static data modification for data hiding.  We 
then challenge the security community by introducing an entirely new network data hiding methodology, 
which we refer to as real-time network data steganography. Finally, we provide the groundwork for this 
fundamental change of covert network data embedding by introducing a system-level implementation for 
real-time network data operations that will open the path for even further advances in computer network 
security.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Even though the origins of steganography reach back to the time of ancient Greece, to Herodotus 
in 440 BC, the art of steganography continues to evolve. This is especially true in the technical 
methods of digital embedding [1][2].  Digital steganography has been used since the early 1980’s 
and network steganography techniques quickly evolved with the advent of the Internet and 
standardized multimedia formats used for data exchange [3]. These early network steganography 
methods have remained consistent in technique with only minor variances associated with network 
applications. We will introduce the next logical evolution of network steganography; moving from 
the simple static data modification class of attacks on data-at-rest, to a more complex set of threats 
that involve modification on the transition operations involving data-in-motion and data-in-use [4].   
Figure 1 shows the interaction of the cyber threat domain interfacing with both the data-at-rest and 
data-in-motion domains.  Data-at-rest steganography is characterized by embedding applications 
that target static multimedia files.  Data-in-motion embedding methods enters into the domain of 
network protocol modifications. This interaction defines the concept of network steganography.  
Network steganography is essentially the exploitation of network elements and protocols for 
implementing covert communications [5].  These threats imposed by network steganography are 
  
generally considered one of the most difficult challenges facing private and government 
organizations due to not only the technical complexity and sheer volume of data analytics involved 
but also from the national and international law and politics [6][7].  
There are currently three major accepted classifications of network steganography which are the 
protocol storage, protocol timing, and application protocol header modifications [3][5].  Each of 
these methods takes advantage of the open system TCP/IP network communications protocols to 
exploit and establish covert data channels.  Some methods are more efficient and robust than others 
and key features for each will be detailed in this paper.   
 
2. NETWORK STEGANOGRAPHY CONCEPTS 
The idea of using the underlying protocols or elements of the fundamental operation of the networks 
dates by to the early 1980’s during the formation of the early Internet and the defining period for 
many network protocol definitions [3][6].   In fact, a review of several key online databases shows 
that before the year 2000 only 25 papers discuss the topic of network steganography. Since that 
year, to date, over 1000 papers have been cited and more than a dozen sophisticated network 
steganography tools have been developed and released as open source [8].   Table 1 show a list of 
the most used or cited tools with a brief description on each [8].  These tools represents another 
avenue for cyber domain exploitation, such as the covert delivery or exfiltration of data, using the 
network protocol itself.  Network steganography tools are directly contrasted from the many 
applications used for static data embedding.   More specifically, these tools do not rely on the 
embedding of data into carrier files, as is the case with traditional multimedia but instead focus on 
the actual network protocols [6].   
                              Table 1. List of Common Network Steganography Tools 
Tool Year Functionality 
CovertTCP 1997 Covert Channels using TCP and IP headers 
StegTunnel 2003 Timing channel using TCP header fields 
hCovert 2005 Covert channel using HTTP GET requests between webservers 
VoVoIP 2007 Embedding data in PCM voice traffic exchanges 
SteganRTP 2007 Uses RTP of VoIP as payload medium 
Gary-World Team’s 2008 Covert channel projects using TCP and IP headers 
Steganography Studio 2009 Training suite on network steganography tradecraft 
NetCross 2010 Utilizes the DNS protocol to establish covert comm. 
OpenPuff 2011 Multiprotocol embedding toolkit 
SoCat 2013 Network relay transfer between two independent data channels. 
                                                Figure 1. Cyber Threat Interfaces 
  
2.1 STEGANOGRAPHY MODELS  
The seminal model used to describe covert channels in the field of steganography and steganalysis 
is known as the prisoner problem [9].   In this classic model, depicted in Figure 2, supposes 
prisoners are attempting to exchange information while keeping it hidden from a watching warden. 
The prisoners can hide the messages into the cover file and use a prearranged shared key as well as 
a randomization variable to obfuscate the data [9][10].  Because the warden does not know if the 
data exchange contains hidden information, the warden can act in three ways; passive, active, or 
malicious. In the passive warden mode, the messages can be observed but not modified.  With 
active mode, the messages can be slightly modified without any obvious distortion or disruptive 
effects noticed by the exchanging prisoners.  Finally, in active mode, the messages can be 
completely modified even to the point of altering the semantic content or introducing distortive 
effects [9][11].    
 
 
Network steganography is built upon this same prisoner-problem model [3].  The only major 
difference is that medium or cover file used is the network.  When employed specifically on the 
TCP/IP protocol-based Internet, is the network protocol itself and not a traditional carrier file (e.g. 
image, audio).  The standard internetworking model is known to be based on a client-server 
architecture consisting of several protocol regions of operation.  Figure 3 elaborates on this model 
to show three distinct segments of interest. Region 1 consist of application level data.  Region 2 is 
comprised of the structures and functions involved in internetworking and protocol exchanges.  
Region 3 involves the lower level physical data link control operations for moving data on to, off of, 
and between network components; for example routers and switches.  
 
Figure 3. Internetworking Model of Network Steganography 
    Figure 2. Classic Prisoner Problem 
  
Using this model and relating it back to the prisoner-problem, it is noted that the network 
steganography practitioner has full access and control to portions of the application, TCP or UDP, 
and the IP headers to implement a protocol centric covert channel exchange over. More specifically, 
the prisoners control all aspects of Region 1 and Region 2 operations since they are integral to the 
end system operations.  Figure 4 shows the span of data control ownership at the end-point system, 
or that which the prisoner controls.  This figure clearly shows that in the client-server paradigm of 
the Internet, a majority of the command and control of the data exchange is influenced by the end 
user [12][13].   It is this control structure, which allows network steganography to be implemented 
between communicating end systems on the Internet [14]. 
Back to Figure 3, the Region 3 data will typically be structured as shown in Figure 5 below.  In this 
case, the underlying network and device drivers use the Ethernet datalink protocol to encapsulate 
and transport the upper level data.  In classic network steganography, Region 3 data modification 
is not consider and is not affected by Region 1 and Region 2 modifications.  In real-time network 
data steganography the entire span of the protocol structure will be considered which we describe 
later in more detail.   
2.2 CLASSIC NETWORK STEGANOGRAPHY CHANNELS  
In order to properly convey this diverse set of information involved in TCP/IP network application-
based steganography, the generalized concepts of covert channels will first be used to describe two 
major classifications models.  These are the storage channels and timing channels shown in Region 
2 in the previous Figure 3 [3].  A third method, which has gained some increased recognition over 
the last several year, is referred to as the application protocol channels [3].  
First, we define the overarching principle characteristics of these covert channels.  In the first major 
category, storage channels are essentially employed by manipulating prescribed elements in data 
structures from which the sender and receiver can extract the prearranged coded values [15]. The 
second type of network steganography are the timing channels.  Timing channel steganography is 
defined where covert communications is established by the artful modulation of a shared resource 
over a prescribed time period in order to effect an information exchange [16].   The third type, 
application protocol channeling, the application-level protocol exchanges themselves are used to 
Figure 4. Region 1 and Region 2 Generalized Data Structure 
Figure 5. Typical Region 3 Data Structure 
  
establish a covert communication channels [3][17][18].  These application protocol header 
exchange methods implement secret communications by using resources residing above the socket 
layer of the Internet protocol suite [19].  The next several sections continue with the descriptions 
for these three types of covert network channeling methods and detail some specific examples for 
each. 
 
2.2.1 PROTOCOL STORAGE CHANNELS 
Storage channel steganography is implemented by manipulating and interpreting information 
beyond what is normally expected within predefined fields of a data structures. The TCP and IP 
data structures used in digital networking have been found to be very susceptible to covert channel 
exploitation in a number of ways [20][21][22].  Figure 6 below details the structure for the IP 
datagram and TCP segment, which are in use today on the Internet [12].  The IP data structure 
shown is known as version 4.  While a version 6 is in fact in wide use on the Internet, for brevity, 
this research investigation will focus solely on version 4 as this is the predominant protocol in used 
on the Internet making up over 98% of all network traffic [23].    
These two network protocol data structures and their field interpretations form the basis of a number 
of opportunities for network protocol steganography.  Consider for instance the IP packet structure 
which consists of 13 specified fields.  A number of the fields of the IP packet are known as mutable 
or changeable fields [13].  The mutable fields of interest are generally the identification, flags, 
fragment offset and time to live (TTL) fields.  While these fields are subject to modification during 
transmission through the routers on the Internet, they can still be used as covert channels from 
sender to receiver [3][6].  A judicious modification to data in these fields does not affect the normal 
operation of the transfer protocol and so any well fashioned cover data often goes unnoticed and 
undisrupted [3][21].  
One well known example of using these IP mutable fields as a covert storage channel is in the use 
of the identification, flags, and fragment offset fields [3][6][20].  In normal network datagrams 
transfers, these fields are used to control the fragmentation and reassembly of oversized datagrams 
that might pass through routers with datagram size restrictions. The datagram size for a data 
exchange can be determined by sending probing packets that discover the maximum transmission 
unit (MTU).  The steganographer can discover the average, smallest MTU during a discovery probe 
and then simply choose a size even lower than this. In this way they are almost guaranteed that 
datagrams will not be segmented.  Since the client controls the forming of the datagrams with the 
IP head, these fields – identification, flags, and offset – can be used to send embedded data of their 
choosing yielding up to 32 bits of covert data per packet header [20].  A similar method can be used 
to transmit data using the TTL field [24][25].  Since the TTL field is decremented by one at each 
router along the transmission path, a covert channel can be established that uses the upper two, 
    Figure 6. IP and TCP Data Structures 
  
three, or even four bits of this eight-bit field.  The range of bit usage in this technique is clearly 
dependent on the number of intermediate routers.  The number of path routers can however be 
discovered though a similar discovery probing method, namely traceroute.  Other fields in the IP 
protocol header have been used for network steganography such as the type of service, protocol, 
header check sum, and the options field with boundary padding [3][24][26]. All of these IP header 
storage channel techniques have been successfully demonstrated on the Internet, each with varying 
levels of persistent success and overall covert channel bandwidth[3][24][25][26].  
The TCP protocol header has also been used for network storage channel based steganography 
[3][16].  Unlike the IP header fields which can be modified by intermediate routers over the mutable 
field variables, the TCP header remains untouched and immutable by the datagram routing process 
over the Internet [12][3].  The TCP segment is completely managed and modified by the protocol 
stack software operating between two end-to-end client systems, thereby giving the steganographer 
full access to the data structure as a storage medium[13][14].  
 
The most well know TCP based steganography storage channel is related to the sequence number 
fields [24][27][28]. To understand how this might be possible, consider that in a normal data 
exchange, the sender will generate an initial sequence number from which the sender and receiver 
then track and exchange the current state and count of the number of data bytes transferred.  Given 
that the sequence fields are 32 bits in length, the most significant bits of this field could be used to 
send covert data for each TCP session established.  This is just one simple of how the TCP header 
could be used and there are a number of more complex covert channel implementations that us TCP 
sequence exchanges. And just like with the IP header, the other fields within the TCP data structure 
– window sized, checksum, urgent point, options, padding have been used as covert storage 
channels as well [24][27][28]. 
 
General research in storage channels for network protocols tend to center on the TCP and IP 
protocol data structures.  It should be noted that while these are the predominant protocols, their 
use is not exclusive.  Referencing Figure 3 again, one may note that in Region 2 of this protocol 
model there is the user datagram protocol (UDP) structure.  UDP is a very common protocol on the 
Internet used in extensively in gaming, video, and audio streaming applications. A number of 
steganographic network storage channel methods have been described as using the UDP transport 
[24][29][30].  It is also worth noting that as shown in Region 2 of the protocol model a space exists 
between the TCP and UDP descriptors.  This is due to the fact that proprietary or user unique 
applications can be developed and implemented by clients and/or servers on the Internet.  The open 
system architecture model embraced by the Internet paradigm allows for a plethora of Region 2 
protocols to exist.  This fact is what often drives the notion that the Internet communications 
protocol is virtually riddled with covert channels [26][31][32].  
  
2.2.2 PROTOCOL TIMING CHANNELS 
  
 Timing channels can be implemented by modulating the packet transmission rate, changing the 
sequence timing, or modifying the packet loss or packet order [3][24].   Perhaps the best way to 
visualize the implementation of this type of network steganography is to view the timing diagram 
of Figure 7 below.  This figure shows the sequence of packet transmission and arrival over time 
period of a client-server data exchange.  This exchange is fully managed by the TCP software 
module on each of the end systems during the data exchange sequence and represents the case for 
end-user covert channel management. The TCP fields of interest during this transaction can include 
the sequence, acknowledgement, flags, windows size, and urgent pointer field [12][13].   
  
In addition to these discrete protocol fields, there are associated timers that are set and managed by 
each of the end systems.  It is the manipulation of these timers, along with the field values that can 
result in somewhat sophisticated and complex series of cover timing channels. The implicit 
modifications in the timing or sequence of events are what can establish uniquely interpreted 
changes that can result in covert time-based data exchanges between two participating end user 
systems [24][33].  
 
As an example implementation of timing channel network steganography consider the previous 
figure that shows four datagrams being delivered in succession.  The timing for the delivery of 
these packets is managed by special timers in the TCP software on the end user systems [12][13].  
By slightly modifying the time for transmission, perhaps by +/-100 ms, the client and server can 
easily exchange a controlled series of binary values [24].  Another implementation involves the 
transmission and subsequent delivery of out of sequence packets [33][34].  Again, this is controlled 
by the end systems so carefully modulating the order of delivery can represent a unique series in a 
time-based binary stream [24].  
  
2.2.3  APPLICATION PROTOCOL CHANNELS  
In Figures 5 we saw the defined protocol headers for managing the internet protocol, the transport 
protocol (consisting of a TCP or UDP header) and also for the application protocol. It is worth 
noting that while the internetwork and transport headers are required elements of the protocol 
exchange and routing process, the application header is not mandatory and is often not used.  In  
Figure 6, we also observe a well-defined canonical format for the two defined network protocol 
headers.  When we consider the application protocol header, this is not the case.   
 
The application header is used by the end systems to interpret and otherwise manage how the actual 
application data will be handled.  Given that countless applications that could be developed, no 
single standard can be defined. Moreover, the Region 1 area of the protocol stack, as shown in 
Figure 3, is controlled 100% by the end user systems.   We know that this is the same region in 
which, for example, multimedia data embedding can occur.   
 
At this point, we highlight the fact that there is a distinct difference between end point application 
data embedding and application-protocol steganography channels.  With end-point originated 
application steganography, the data is modified independent of the application protocol header 
[15][24].  With application-protocol steganography, any given protocol application can be used for 
a covert channel, but will remain fully independent of the data being managed by the actual 
application [29][35].  
 
Figure 7. TCP Data Timing Exchange 
  
There are a number of published research studies that describe the means and methods to implement 
application-protocol covert channels [36][37][38].  Some specific Region 1 protocols investigated 
for exploitation have included HTTP, DNS, SMTP, FTP, and streaming applications over UDP 
with RTP and VoIP.   We now briefly review a few of these common methods in an effort to further 
clarify the distinction between traditional multimedia application based steganography and 
application-protocol network steganography which involves the modification of the actual 
application protocol header exchanges. 
 
2.2.3.1 HTTP APPLICATION-LEVEL STEGANOGRAPHY  
Consider as an example, an HTTP based exchange.  The HTTP protocol is a fairly well defined 
standard used to exchange information between webservers and web clients.  There may be a 
number of different web client applications that could interface to a given webserver.  For example, 
a webserver running Apache server code could interact with a number of different web browser 
such as Microsoft Explorer, Google Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and others.  The end-node operating 
system could be Windows, Linux, Apple, Android, or a number of other obscure operating systems 
[39].  In order for the browser to be able to function properly with the webserver, an application 
level control header is used in the application region of the datagram, Region 1, to properly manage 
the overall data exchange.  These transactions occur independently of the overarching transport 
control for functionality being performed by the TCP session exchange handlers [14].   
 
A TCP session exchange can, for instance, operate normally without any timing or storage channel 
involved.  Over this same session, the HTTP application protocol can be used as either a storage or 
timing delivery channel.  This can be implemented independent of TCP by using, for example, the 
HTTP close or persist commands that would modify the sequence/time of delivery of the data [14].  
An HTTP storage channel, again independent of protocol process Region 2, could be implemented 
using a number of mutable fields defined in the HTTP such as the structures surrounding the put, 
post and get commands [14].   Figure 8 graphically depicts the most basic protocol exchanges for 
several widely used internetworking applications.  The basic process just described applies to these 
and countless other internetworking applications.     
                                            Figure 8. Application Protocol Exchanges 
  
2.2.3.2 VOIP APPLICATION-LEVEL STEGANOGRAPHY 
 
The rapid rise of transmitting voice data over the Internet using voice over IP (VoIP) followed by 
the development and subsequent explosive use of the VoIP application, Skype, spurred much 
research into how to use these environments for covert communications [29][30].  VoIP is a stream-
based communications protocol that uses the real-time protocol (RTP) to set up and control the data 
flow [29][30].  An associated protocol, the real-time control protocol (RTCP) is used in conjunction 
with RTP to provide out-of-band statistics and control information for RTP sessions [12][13].  The 
basic structure of the RTP header is shown below in Figure 9 [12].  One described method of using 
this application protocol header for steganography is to merge the RTCP and RTP control 
information and embed unused bits in the IP, UDP, and RTP headers to signal various parameters 
that enable watermarking data in the voice stream.   Another method, known as SkyDe, uses silence 
periods of a voice call to embedded encrypted steganography data and use the RTP and UDP 
headers to signal which packets are covert information [29][30].  
Each of these examples show that, like the more well-known storage-protocol and timing-protocols 
of IP and TCP, a much broader range of application-protocol header fields can be investigated for 
their potential to also be used to establish covert communications.   These illustrative techniques 
form the major class of methods of what is known to be classical network steganography.  The first 
two, storage and timing, are implemented strictly within the Region 2 space of the protocol stack.  
This latest method class, application-protocol, uses the Region 1 application header fields but may 
rely on some aspects of Region 2 to aid in the employment. 
 
2.2.4 CLASSICAL NETWORK STEGANOGRAPHY CAPACITY  
 
Multimedia files are used in traditional steganography due to the high capacity and as ubiquitous 
nature of the formats. The capacity of multimedia files such as images or audio formats is measured 
in terms directly related to the carrier file.  For example an image of size 512x512 bytes, using a 
simple LSB embedding algorithm has an overall steganographic data capacity of just under 33,000 
bytes.  A simple audio wave encoding algorithm running against a file with 44100 samples per 
second has an embedding capacity of over 650,000 bytes in just 30 seconds.  Network 
steganography, including all the classical methods described in the previous section, will have 
embedding capacities that pale in comparison with traditional multimedia steganography 
[1][2][3][24].  Covert data channels which use network protocol signaling have capacities which 
are measured in terms of data throughput using bits per packet, or sometimes bytes per second [3].   
Before detailing some of the typical values for classical network steganography, some governing 
principles of network operation that constrain the channel bandwidth are presented.  
 
                                                Figure 9. RTP Encapsulation and RTC Protocol Header 
  
2.2.5 NETWORK THROUGHPUT CONSTRAINTS  
 
In referring back Figure 7, it was shown that the TCP data exchange between two communication 
points implements an initiation synchronization and acknowledge model [14].  The simplified 
transaction shown in this figure depicts an initial client-server contact followed by a data request 
and data delivery phase.  The classical network steganography methods discussed in the previous 
sections are dependent on this fundamental communications transaction model, given that these 
defined covert channels are relying on the TCP and IP protocol header structures to convey the 
hidden information [24]. As such, the maximum achievable covert channel bandwidth or 
throughput for these classical network steganography methods will also be constrained by this 
model.  
Figure 10 shows a more detailed time-based sequence of data exchange between a sender and 
receiver [14]. Several factors are evident from this diagram that contribute to the calculation of 
throughput for network steganography.  First, this is a measurable transmission propagation time 
period, Tp, from the sender to the receiver.  This time period is usually calculated in either 
milliseconds for network-to-network connections or in microseconds if the sender and receive are 
on the same network (i.e. LAN segment).  Secondly, there is a slight delay from the receipt of the 
original message to the transmission of the acknowledgement message.  This is the nodal 
processing time, Tnp that is typically measured in microseconds or nanoseconds [14].  Next, there 
is a return propagation timeframe once the receiver transmits the acknowledgement datagram.  The 
entirety of this time period, from the beginning of initial sequence, to the receipt of the 
acknowledgement datagram is calculated as the network round trip time, RTT, for a TCP connection 
[14].  
                                        Figure 10. TCP Data Transfer with 4K Buffer 
  
Any loss of data packets or TCP segments will ultimately affect the overall network protocol 
channel throughput or usability of the network for covert communications.  Additionally, difficulty 
in manipulating and controlling TCP segment delivery will affect network steganography 
throughput [24].  These issues are all related to network congestion detection and control [14].  
Referring again to Figure 10, another aspect of network data flow control that will come into play 
during classical network steganography is the management of how the applications read and write 
to a discrete defined buffer space during data transactions [24].  In the example shown in the current 
figure, a 4KB receiver memory space is reserved for packet data processing. Before the 
transmission of new data can occur, the sender must receive an acknowledgment that the receiver 
buffer is available.  Buffer management will affect network timing when using TCP timing 
channels [3][14]. This same buffer configuration could also be used to actually implement a covert 
channel itself; such as sending or not sending data when the buffer is full or not full.  In any case, 
buffer management becomes an important component to classical network steganography [3][24].   
As an example of throughput comparison between traditional multimedia carrier-based data hiding 
and network steganography consider the following. With a standard BMP color image file of size 
512x512 pixels, using only one color layer, the available carrier bytes is 262,144.  This equates to 
an embedding capacity of 32,768 bytes if using simple LSB data embedding. Higher covert channel 
capacities are certainly achievable. Given this same image, which is 512x512x3 bytes, or 
approximately 786,432 bytes transferred over a TCP/IP network, a typical number of transactions 
from sender to receiver would be approximately 540 unilateral datagrams of size 1460.  On a local 
area network this transfer would occur in a fraction of a second (e.g. 600 msec).  If we consider 
using just the IP storage channel as previously described, we could potentially use 8 bits per packet.  
At best, this could achieve 540 bytes of transfer.  Comparing 540 bytes to the approximately 33KB 
for traditional steganography adequately describes the contrast.   
It is clear that the bandwidth of the classical network steganography channels are not as expansive 
as traditional multimedia carrier files.  However, in one study of a specific network, it was estimated 
that each packet could be used to carry 8 bytes of covert data [37].  The test network cited externally 
transmitted approximately 500 million packets per day [37].  A malicious insider, able to exploit 
this steganographic network channel, could potentially exfiltrate data at a rate exceeding 4 GB 
daily, or approximately 1.5 TB annually – all via this often overlooked and unmonitored data 
channel.  
 
3. NEXT GENERATION NETWORK STEGANOGRAPHY 
 
Having described the fundamental background information for the various types of network 
steganography, in this section we develop the necessary background that will lead to the definition 
for real-time network data steganography.  First, consider the Venn diagram as shown in Figure 
11.  The steganography cyber threat presented earlier is now expanded to intersect with all three 
data states, resulting in five distinct cyber threat subdomains.  Two additional transitional 
subdomains are also shown; the data-at-rest to data-in-motion (DAR-DIM) region, and the data-in-
motion to data-in-use (DIM-DIU) region.  We assert that these two specific areas are concerned 
with normal system operations and data flow.  These regions are fairly standardized interfaces 
which support application-level processing and network operations. We will however, be 
concerned with those regions where there is direct overlap or intersection with the named 
steganography cyber threat.  
  
Looking first at the major intersections of the steganography cyber threat (SCT) domain with the 
DAR and DIU domains, we define these areas as multimedia steganography activities.  The 
subdomain of DAR represents the well-known area of multimedia data hiding. The DIU major 
subdomain is very similar to the DAR steganography domain in that we define this as real-time 
multimedia steganography.  This domain is consistent with the typical data-at-rest form of 
steganography with the major difference being the operations are performed at the application level, 
actively by the user.  An example of this type of real-time application embedding is the hCovert 
covert channel tool which is implemented using HTTP GET requests between webservers during 
an active communications session [40].  Embedding tools, such as the hCovert application, for this 
subdomain are not as prolific as the static multimedia steganography domain; however we predict 
tool capabilities to continue to emerge.  
Additional subdomain sets of interest in the Venn diagram are formed by the direct intersections 
with the data-in-motion (DIM) domain.  The resultant intersections define three sub-domains and 
it is these three regions that are of most interest in this paper.  The symbolic definitions for these 
regions are shown in Table 2 below.  
 
                                    Table 2. Network Steganography Symbolic Definitions 
 
The first minor subdomain of these regions is the classical network protocol steganography, or NPS 
type of covert communications.  One unique clarifying characteristic of NPS methods is that they 
operate in a transitory state between data-at-rest and data-in-motion. This unique feature is possible 
only because the end-user system has full control of the formation and management of the 
datagrams.  Recall that NPS implementation occurs in region 2 of the protocol space, before it is 
actually presented to the lower level network interface handler of protocol region 3.  Because of 
the dependent properties between static and dynamic data transitioning, we choose to omit the real-
time moniker from the NPS definition. 
                           
Class Type Abbreviation Definition 
I Real-Time Network Steganography RT-NS DIM ∩ SCT 
II Network Protocol Steganography NPS DAR ∩ DIM ∩ SCT 
III Real-time Application Network Steganography RT-ANS DIM ∩ DIU ∩ SCT 
IV Real-time Network Data Steganography RT-NDS (RT-NS)–[NPS+(RT-ANS)] 
Figure 11. Data Intersects of Steganography Cyber Threats 
  
A minor subdomain observable in Figure 11 is real-time application-level network steganography, 
or RT-ANS, which is closely related to network protocol steganography, in that it also resides in a 
transitory state, namely the data-in-use to data-in-motion domains.  The major difference between 
RT-ANS and NPS and is that with RT-ANS, execution of steganography occurs using active 
applications as opposed to traditional, well-known static toolsets.  Specifically, the active 
applications in RT-ANS are not used to form the region 2 data structures (ref Fig 3). The operating 
system takes full control of the application presentation to the lower datagram assembly processes 
in the lower region [12].  Real-time operations are maintained and the dynamic nature of this 
domain is maintained.  Examples of this type of real-time steganographic functionality are the 
VoVoIP toolset or Skype embedding as is described in the SkyDe [29].  The SoCat application, 
which opens named pipes between users to establish a covert data channel, is another excellent 
example from the RT-ANS threat subdomain, exhibiting dynamic covert communications 
properties [40].   
 
Next, the majority subdomain in Venn diagram is formed by the full intersection of the data-in-
motion and the steganography cyber threat.  We define this composite region as real-time network 
steganography as indicated in Table 2.  The entirety of this region envelopes the concepts of classic 
network steganography as well as real-time application steganography.  We derived our unique 
definition for real-time network data steganography as shown in Table 2.  
Class IV network steganography defines our real-time  network data steganography (RT-NDS).  
This type consists of the discrete region which is characterized by the condition that data-in-motion 
interacts with the steganography cyber threat fully independent of any end-user systems or 
application processing before the data is set into motion.  Data modifications in this class of network 
steganography occur strictly while the data is in transit between the network origination and 
destination end points. 
  
4. REAL-TIME NETWORK DATA STEGANOGRAPHY 
 
We further define RT-NDS as a distinct subset of the overarching real-time network steganography 
domain with unique characteristic operational properties.  To illustrate this distinction, we refer to 
Figure 12 which depicts the data structure for a network Ethernet frame from within the region 3 
protocol space. From this figure, we observe the span of effect for each of the various type of 
steganography. It should be noted that information transitions between networking nodes and 
remains in a region 3 state until it is delivered to an end destination.   
Recall that with traditional multimedia steganography, covert data is embedded in multimedia 
cover files and transmitted from end-to-end nodes within static data segments.  In this instance, the 
effects on the datagram structure are fixed in region 1 and no user node operation occurs outside of 
this protocol space.  In classical network steganography, the datagram headers in the protocol space 
of region 2 are used to embed covert data.  These specific operations still occur at the end-user 
nodes, manipulated and managed without affecting the application data, again derived from the 
Figure 12. Span of Real-time Network Data Steganography 
  
region 1 space.  Thus, we reemphasize the condition that traditional steganography and classical 
network steganography have bounded and constrained functionality set at the end-user nodes. 
  
4.1 REAL-TIME DATA TRANSFER CONSIDERATIONS   
Real-time network data steganography varies markedly from the previous embedding types.  The 
targeted data object (intended carrier file) in the datagram is the multimedia application data 
constructed during application data segmentation.  Data embedding in RT-NDS operations occurs 
during the actual transmission phase of the data transfer.  This is the time period between when the 
data is transmitted over the transmission medium by the sender to the time when the data is 
recovered from the medium by the receiver.  No direct action from end-user nodes occurs on the 
datagrams.  As shown in Figure 12 above, the entire data structure is considered during RT-NDS 
functions, to include the lower level network datalink construct, in this case Ethernet.  
Whereas traditional network steganography involves the modification of protocol structures as its 
main covert channel carrier, real-time network steganography encompasses the entire range of the 
transmitted data structure with modification of the entire datagram and network datalink level 
construct during data-in-motion.  More to the point, modifications are performed on individual data 
streams as data transfers over packetized networks.  It should be clear then that given the range of 
data control in RT-NDS, operations in this data domain can involve or even implement classic 
network steganography algorithms, but in real-time using intermediate nodes.   
We now consider an example by showing active data operation actions involving datagrams 
entering and leaving this RT-NDS subdomain.  Figure 13 represents the high-level processes 
involved in transmitting an image between two network nodes.  The image shown consists of a 
typical 512x512 BMP format with the three-color layers, red, blue and green.  With these three 
layers and the fixed size of the file, the calculated nominal transfer size is 262,144 x 3 layers or 
786,432 bytes.  File metadata format bytes are also included in the gross file transfer for canonical 
image data structures. The final size of the file to be transferred in just over 786,460 bytes.   
This figure depicts the image first being segmented by the end-user application and data networking 
layers to properly allocate the data space available in the individual packets.  This segmentation on 
this size of image will create roughly 540 individual data segments, packaged and presented to the 
network as 1460-byte datagrams.  The addition of the IP and TCP along with the Ethernet header 
and frame check sequence value will result in roughly 540 individual network frames, each with a 
size of 1514 bytes.     
Under the conditions that this image file is in transit, we have stated that RT-NDS involves the 
modification of the application data portion of each of these Ethernet frames as they are transported 
across the network.  Given that the network frame is already constructed and in the transmission 
Figure 13. Image Segmentation and Transmission 
  
state (data-in-motion), any changes to the application data space will (as shown in Figure 12 above) 
have direct effects across the entire network frame.  For example, the TCP header contains a 16-bit 
checksum value as part of its 20-byte structure.  This checksum is calculated over the application 
data and the TCP header itself and is used to ensure that no modifications or data errors occur 
during transmission.  Therefore, changes to the application data necessitate the recalculation of the 
TCP header checksum [12].  
The IP header also has a 16-bit CRC checksum field, however this value is only applicable to the 
IP header itself and does not include the encapsulated TCP or application data it is routing [12].  IP 
header checksums are calculated by the intermediate router to account for mutable field changes 
such as the time to live or TTL field, which incidentally changes at each routing node [12].  
Additionally, each time an Ethernet frame is generated for transmission, such as between router 
nodes or on the last network segment before delivery to the receiver node, a frame check sequence, 
or FCS, is also calculated.  This FCS ensures the entire datagram has maintained its integrity 
between network nodes.  Any change in the datagram will therefore require a recalculation of the 
FCS.  Therefore, any changes to the data field of transiting datagrams will necessitate a 
recalculation of both the TCP CRC value and the Ethernet FCS [12]. 
Referring once again to the data structure of Figure 12 we note that RT-NDS affects the same 
application data space as traditional static application steganography.  The major difference 
between these two types is exemplified by the fact that RT-NDS steganography happens outside of 
and beyond control of the end-user node whereas traditional steganography occurs before the 
application data is presented to the region 2 network protocol space.  Therefore, for traditional 
steganography, no consideration is given to the TCP, IP or network datalink levels for this type of 
covert communications.  
This is also the case for classical network protocol steganography.  Specifically, NPS operations 
occurs directly at the end nodes before the datagram is presented to the network datalink level.  
Because the datagram is constructed at the originating end-user nodes, any steganography relevant 
changes will be incorporated directly in the TCP checksum value which will then not change during 
end-to-end data delivery.  If the IP fields are used for covert communications, as in the case of an 
IP storage channel, the IP checksum is originally calculated at the point of origin for all immutable 
fields that are being used to implement the channel and the normal mutable fields, affected by 
routing will be modified as needed by the routing functions.  RT-NDS clearly involves some 
additional network operational burdens that are not a factor for traditional steganography or 
classical network protocol data channels. 
 
4.2 REAL-TIME NETWORK DATA INTERCEPT CONSIDERATIONS  
  
When transmitting data, such as an image file between end-user nodes, each of the individual 
network frames will traverse over the network links and, as was previously discussed, the reliable 
transport, delivery, and presentation of the image data is managed by TCP operational exchanges 
between the sender and the receiving nodes.  We know these individual datagrams are routed and 
analyzed by any intermediate routing devices to ensure the TCP segments are properly presented 
to the end system to be accounted for by the receiving application [13].   
Moreover, multimedia data files are transferred from servers to clients, or between end-user nodes 
in non-monolithic fashion.  Specifically within networks, data files are transmitted as segmented 
data structures using datagrams [13].  While TCP monitors and manages the data flow, there is no 
guarantee that the data will be presented to the receiver in the same order as it was transferred from 
  
the sender [12].  A number of network considerations come into play as data flows over and 
between networks from end-point to end-point.  Conditions such as a change of datagram routing 
due to network congestion may result in packets being delivered out of order [13]. Loss of actual 
network frames and datagrams, due to intermediating network collisions can also result in the need 
to retransmit lost data. These are just two of many unpredictable circumstances that affect network 
data communications [13].  
The implications of these network frame intercept considerations, under conditions that likely 
involve out of order or lost datagrams are significant.  The successful application of real-time 
network data embedding into well-ordered multimedia data segments is critical for proper end-
point extraction of the intended covert data.   We continue our introduction and exploration of 
network data steganography by introducing a generalized network intercept model. 
   
4.3 REAL-TIME SYSTEM INTEGRATION  
We further clarify the concept of real-time network data interception and embedding using the 
model shown in Figure 14. This figure shows two end point devices that may be transmitting a 
targeted multimedia file.  In this figure, four potential intercept and embedding scenarios are shown 
by devices that may reside at various points on the network. These notional systems are capable of 
performing the aforementioned operations of frame interception, analysis, modification, and 
retransmission necessary to implement real-time network data steganography. These RT-NDS 
system operate unbeknownst to the end point systems or the intermediate routing network nodes 
and normal communications is maintained by these systems.    
This network configuration with an integrated real-time intercept system is a prime example of the 
real-time network steganography cyber threat.  Under these conditions the means to embed covert 
data in various multimedia content is conceivable. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
Table 3 and Figure 15 are six representative image files used to demonstrate the real-time 
embedding of BMP images by the RT-NDS system.  In our initial experiments, the simple LSB +/-  
method was used [4].  For the RGB image files only the LSB value of the red layer will be changed.  
 
 
                                      Figure 14. Real-time Network Steganography Access Points 
  
Table 3. Representative Image Parametric Data Set 
Representative 
 Image Set (bmp) 
Structure Dimensions 
Size 
(Kbytes) 
LSB Embedding 
Capacity 
Peppers RGB 512x512x3 768 262,144 
Baboon RGB 512x512x3 768 262,144 
Barbara Grayscale 510x510x3 764 260,100 
Lena Grayscale 512x512x3 768 262,144 
Diamond Grayscale 256x256x1 65 65,536 
House Grayscale 256x256x1 65 65,536 
5.1 Real-Time Results and Analysis 
Table 4 shows the  results of the representative image transfers over the test network, passing 
through the RT-NDS system.  To demonstrate the effectiveness of the embedding process, 100% 
of the least significant bits were modified for the targeted red-layer.   As shown in the Table 4 the 
total transmission time difference for the files ranges from an instantaneous delay of 35 
milliseconds for the 65 Kb file size to approximately 575 milliseconds of delay for the larger 768 
Kb image files.  Essentially the impact of the RS-NDS is about ½ a second delay for an average 
sized image file.                                                
Table 4. Real-Time Steganography System Performance 
Representative 
 Image Set 
Size 
(Kbytes) 
Transmission Speed (ms) 
Difference (ms) 
Direct RT-NDS 
Peppers 768 85.67 661.01  575.35 
Baboon 768 83.15 642.12  558.97  
Barbara 764 81.18 531.23  450.05 
Lena 768 83.48 627.15  543.67 
Diamond 65 7.28 42.82 35.54 
House 65 8.59 43.23  34.64 
Greater analysis shows that the overall network degradation is approximately 13%.  Given that the 
system is modifying every third byte in the real-time data stream over the entire length of the file 
with an overall average delay of less than ½ second, this performance should be considered 
acceptable.  Additionally, given the preliminary testing was performed on commodity hardware 
with non-optimized prototype software indicates many paths for improved performance.  
Efficiency gains can be expected with an optimized code base running on dedicated processors or 
specialized programmable devices (e.g. DSP or FGPA). 
Figure 15. Representative Image Set  
  
 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have introduced new concepts and implementation methodologies relating to a 
novel capability called real-time network data steganography.  There is a lack of published research 
for this specific domain, therefore some key contributions for this emerging technology include:  
 
- Defines symbolic representation of technology domain in relation to cyber security threats 
- Introduces novel network steganography techniques using real-time stream analysis  
- Describes non-disruptive modification methods of multimedia files in real-time data streams 
 
This research explores real-time network data steganography where we describe how this new 
embedding method compares and contrasts with traditional notions of network steganography or 
static data application-based steganography. We also discussed some unique real-time network 
operations considerations for embedding data in internetworked data streams. Finally this basic 
research document is intended to form the groundwork for future research in the domain of real-
time network data embedding technologies.  
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